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1. INTRODUCTION

On December 13, 1995, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
broke new ground when it decided in Farley v. Sartin' that a nonviable fetus is
a "person" within the meaning of West Virginia's wrongful death statute.' In
speaking for the unanimous court, Justice Cleckley reasoned that:
[J]ustice is denied when a tortfeasor is permitted to walk away
with impunity because of the happenstance that the unborn child
had not yet reached viability at the time of death . . .. Our
concern reflects the fundamental value determination of our
society that life-old, young, and prospective-should not be
wrongfully taken away
466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
2 Id. at 534 (citing W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1994)).
3 Id. at 533.
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In making this "fundamental value determination" 4 that prospective,
nonviable life should be protected under the wrongful death statute, the court
greatly expanded the realm of fetal rights. Nevertheless, Justice Cleckley
reasoned that this expansion "neither affects nor interferes with the constitutional
protection afforded a woman who chooses to have an abortion."' With little
explanation, the court concluded that a woman's constitutional right to have an
abortion was not a tortious act and, therefore, not relevant to actions for wrongful
death.
However, the court failed to recognize the "inherent conflict" in granting a
woman a constitutional right to terminate a nonviable fetus that has full
personhood status under the wrongful death statute.7 Although the court in Farley
attempted to limit its holding to the scope of wrongful death actions,8 its decision
paves the way for new and expansive civil and criminal liability and intrusive
state action against pregnant women. Even more alarming, the Farley court's
recognition of nonviable fetal rights may lead to violations of a woman's rights
to privacy, bodily integrity, and parental autonomy, and may even infringe on a
woman's constitutional right to have an abortion. 9 This article examines the

4

id.

' Id. at 534.
6

Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534-35. Justice Cleckley offered the following explanation of abortion

rights, in light of the court's decision to recognize a nonviable fetus as a person in a wrongful death
action:
To be clear, a wrongful death action will not lie against a woman who chooses
to exercise her constitutional right to have an abortion. By definition, if a
woman has a constitutional right to decide whether to carry an unborn child to
term or abort it, then the act of aborting is not tortious. In such cases, the
reasons for invoking the wrongful death statute do not apply; there is no tortious
conduct to deter.
Id.
7 Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); see also Robin C. Hewitt, Case
Comment, Farley v. Sartin: Viability of a Fetus No Longer Requiredfor Wrongful Death Liability,
98 W. VA. L. REV. 955, 974 (1996).
Parley, 466 S.E.2d at 534-35.
F
9 See Rebecca Manson & Judy Marolt, A New Crime, Fetal Neglect: State Intervention to Protect
the Unborn-Protectionat What Cost?, 24 CAL. W. L. REv. 161, 161 (1988).
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"slippery slope"'" of possible ramifications that follow from conferring separate
legal rights to a nonviable fetus.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS INVOLVED
A.

Pre-Roe v. Wade Decisions

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that certain
inherent liberties arise from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."
These liberty interests encompass freedom from both physical and mental bodily
restraint.

2

In Meyer v. Nebraska,13 the Court expanded the realm of implicit and
protected liberty interests to include freedoms concerning marriage and childrearing. 14 The Court further defined and emphasized child-rearing as a liberty
interest two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.5 In denying the state
power to impose public education on its children, the Court in Pierce construed
right "to direct the upbringing and
the child-rearing liberty to include a parent's
'6
control.'
their
under
children
of
education
From these early decisions protecting marriage and child-rearing
emerged the idea of procreative autonomy as a protected liberty interest. For

I0

Janet Gallagher, PrenatalInvasions &Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV.

WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 45 (1987).
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
12

See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).

In explaining the Fourteenth Amendment

liberty interest, the Court stated that "[t]he liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person ... but the term
is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties." Id.
at 589.
'3

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

" Id. at 399. Justice McReynolds explained that liberty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual.., to marry, establish a home and bring up children."
Id.; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Loving noted that "[m]arriage is one of the
'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." Id. at 12 (quoting
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541 (1942)).

'5

268 U.S. 510 (1925).

16

Id. at 534-35.
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example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,7 the United States Supreme Court struck down
a statute which ordered compulsory sterilization for certain felons." In doing so,
the Court elevated the protected liberty status of marriage and procreation to that
of fundamental rights under the Constitution.' 9
Following its early decisions involving marriage, child-rearing, and
procreation, the Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut," recognized a zone of
privacy, inherent within the Constitution, which protects an individual's right to
privacy concerning intimate family relations. 2' In Griswold, the Court struck
down a state statute which forbade the distribution and use of contraceptives."
In doing so, the Court announced that the right to use such devices was a privacy
interest protected by the "penumbra" of rights in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments.23
Subsequently, Griswold paved the way for many more decisions
expanding the right to privacy. For example, a father's right to parenthood was
expressly recognized in Stanley v. Illinois.24 In striking down a state statute under
which children of unwed fathers automatically became wards of the state upon the
death of their mothers, the Court specifically recognized the "interest of a parent
25
in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children. 1
Other post-Griswold privacy interests recognized by the Court include the right

17316 U.S. 535 (1942).
SId; see also Wright, supra note 43, at 1298.

Id. at 541. The Court concluded that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
I9
existence and survival of the race." Id.
20 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21

Id. at 484.

22

Id. at 485.

' Id. at 484; see also Einsenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right to obtain and
use contraceptives to non-married individuals).
24

405 U.S. 645 (1972).

25

Id. at 651.
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to bodily integrity,26 the right to bear
or beget a chil, 7 and the right to enter and
28
maintain personal relationships.
The recognition and subsequent expansion by the Court of the right to
privacy, including the right to marry, 29 procreate," and raise a child" ultimately
paved the way for the Court to recognize the right of a woman to terminate her
pregnancy in the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade.32
B.

Roe v. Wade

In Roe, the United States Supreme Court declared that a woman's right
to abort her unborn fetus was a protected liberty interest within the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33 Specifically, the Court characterized a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy as a "fundamental" right under the Due
Process Clause.34 Therefore, any infringement by the state upon this fundamental

26 See

generally Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing that the
right to bodily integrity requires informed consent for medical treatment).
27 See

Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453.

Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In acknowledging this right, the Court, in part,
reasoned:
[C]hoices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must
be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our
constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives
protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.
Id. at 617-18.
2'

29

See supra note 14.

30 See supra note 17.
31 See supra notes 15 and 16.
32

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

33 Id. at 164.
34

Id. at 154-156.
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right would be subject to strict scrutiny by the courts.35
In deciding that a woman has a fundamental right to terminate her
pregnancy, the Court recognized that a "person," as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn. 36 However, the Court did not grant a
woman the absolute right to have an abortion at any time during her pregnancy.
On the contrary, the Court recognized that, at some point during a woman's
pregnancy, the state's interests in protecting the unborn becomes compelling.3 7
Therefore, the Court balanced the woman's privacy rights against these
state interests and established a trimester system.38 During the first trimester, the
state may not interfere with a woman's decision to have an abortion. 39 However,
from the beginning of the second trimester until the fetus becomes viable,4" the
state may regulate only the abortion procedure, in order to preserve and protect
maternal health. 4' From the time of viability up until birth, the state may prohibit
a woman's right to have an abortion, except if it is necessary to preserve the
health or life of the mother.42
Although the Court in Roe recognized that a woman has a fundamental
and absolute right to obtain an abortion during her first trimester of pregnancy,
when the fetus can only be classified as nonviable, the decision itself has been
43
criticized for planting seeds of doubt and room for departure in its own holding.
For example, although the Court purported to limit state regulation of the abortion

" Id. Strict scrutiny requires the state to have a "compelling state interest" in the activity being
regulated, and that the regulation be "closely tailored" to achieving that interest through the least
restrictive means possible. Id.
36 Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
37 Id. at 155.
31

Id. at 163-64.

39 Id.

"

The Court defined viability as the point at which the fetus is presumed to be capable of

meaningful life outside the mother's womb, or between twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks. Id.
at 160.
4' Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
42

Id. at 163-64.

43 Louise B. Wright, Comment, Fetus v. Mother: CriminalLiability for Maternal Substance Abuse

During Pregnancy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1285, 1298 (1990).
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procedure during the second trimester to interests involving maternal health,
Justice Blackmun, speaking for the majority, wrote in dictum that "[i]n assessing
the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claims that as long
as at least potential life is involved, the state may assert interests beyond the
protection of the pregnant woman alone."' Therefore, the Roe decision itself
supports the view that pregnancy involves not just a woman's interest alone, but
that of the mother and her fetus, and that special deference may be given not just
to viable life, but "potential" life as well."
C.

Post-Roe v. Wade Decisions

The first case to chip away at the Roe decision was Maher v. Roe,46 in
which the Court upheld a state regulation providing Medicare coverage for
childbirth expenses, but not for nontherapeutic abortion expenses.47 The Court
distinguished Maher by stating that the regulation did not impose an additional
burden beyond that already suffered by the woman due to her pre-existing
economic position.4 8 Furthermore, the Court stressed the difference between
direct state interference with a woman's right to an abortion, which was
prohibited by Roe, and state encouragement of childbirth, which was "consonant
with legislative policy," and did not have to withstand the "compelling interest"
49
test.
The erosion of Roe continued in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services." In Webster, the Court upheld a Missouri statute that prohibited the use
of public facilities and the assistance of public employees for unnecessary
abortions. 5' Although the Court left the trimester system established in Roe intact,
the Court declared that states have a "compelling interest" in protecting the life

14

Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.

45

Id.

46

432 U.S. 464 (1977).

47

Id. at 474.

48

Id.

41 Id. at 475, 477.

'0 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
" Id. at 511.
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of the unborn child "throughout pregnancy. 52 In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, rejected Roe's "rigid"53 trimester scheme for establishing
viability, and, instead, argued for the protection of the unborn child from the time
of conception. 4
The strongest blow to the Roe decision came with the Court's decision
in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey. Although not overruling Roe, the Court in
Casey expressly rejected the trimester framework developed in that opinion. 6
Instead, the Court drew the line at viability "so that the independent existence of
the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that
now overrides the rights of the woman.
Furthermore, the Court in Casey lowered a woman's right to abortion
from fundamental right status, subject to strict scrutiny review, to that of
protected liberty interest.5 8 The Court adopted a new test, the undue burden test,
which allows a state to regulate an activity as long as the statute's purpose or
effect is not a substantial obstacle to engaging in that activity.59 For example, the
Court upheld a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period as facilitating "the
wise exercise" of the right to abortion,6" but struck down the spousal notification
provision as imposing a "substantial obstacle" to a woman's right to terminate her

52

Id. at 494. Furthermore, the Court moved the line of viability from twenty-eight weeks to

twenty weeks, stating that a "presumption of viability" was created at the gestational age of twenty
weeks. Id. at 515-16.
5 Id. at 519.
4 Webster, 492 U.S. at 519. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "we do not see why the State's
interest in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the point of viability,
and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing a state regulation after viability but
prohibiting it before viability." Id.
5' 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
56

Id. at 873.

57 Id. at 870.
5s Id. at 874-78.

'9Id at 876.
60

Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
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6

pregnancy. 1
The Court in Casey clarified what had been emerged from the post-Roe
cases: In pregnancy, a woman's interest cannot be evaluated in isolation but must
be balanced against the rights of her fetus. The Court's recognition of fetal
rights, coupled with the recognition by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia of the parent/nonviable fetus relationship interest in wrongful death,
establishes the theoretical groundwork for an explosion of tort litigation involving
fetal rights. As one keen observer cautioned, the recognizing of more and more
fetal rights "would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would 'set
society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation."' 62
III. FORESEEABLE TORT LITIGATION
A.

A Father'sRights and Potential Tort Suits

Although the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth63 and
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey64 rejected a father's assertion of a protected liberty
interest in the life of his unborn child, at least within the first two trimesters, the
Court has never directly addressed a father's appeal for his wife to carry his child
to term, nor has it fully weighed the inherent rights of the father. 6' After the
Farley court's recognition of a father's interest in the life of his nonviable fetus
in the context of wrongful death,66 West Virginia is ripe for a full exploration of
61 Id. at 894. The Court emphasized the plight of the battered woman and the reasons why she

may not want to reveal to her husband a decision to obtain an abortion. Id. at 893. ("Many may
fear devastating forms of psychological abuse from their husbands, including verbal harassment,
threats of future violence, the destruction of possessions, physical confinement to the home, the
withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the abortion to family and friends."); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (rejecting the requirement of spousal consent
before a woman can obtain an abortion).
Hudak v. Gregory, 634 A.2d 600, 605 (Pa. 1993) (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (holding that a
nonviable fetus, bom alive, is a person for which an action for wrongful death and survival may
be maintained).
62

63

See supra note 61.

64

See supra note 61.

'5 See Stefanie L. Black, Comment, Competing Interest in the Fetus: A Look into PaternalRights
After Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 28 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 987, 1011 (1993).
66

Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 533 (W. Va. 1995).
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these paternal rights, especially the right of a father to bring a tort action for the
tortious abortion of his child.
The paternal rights of procreation and association serve as the foundation
for a paternal tort suit against a mother who has terminated a nonviable fetus.
First, freedom of association, including the right to enter and maintain personal
relationships has been recognized by the Court as a fundamental right.67 This
fundamental right of association has been construed to include society, caring and
commitment, intimacy, and self-identification.6" Likewise, the fundamental right
to procreate, recognized by the Court in Skinner, can be construed to protect a
father's choice to enjoy the "society" of a child, to develop an intimate parentchild relationship, and to assume the role and responsibilities of parenthood.69
Along with these paternal rights of intimate association and procreation, a father
has a well-recognized relational interest in the loss of a child, including a fetus
and nonviable fetus under West Virginia law, for purposes of wrongful death.7"
On at least two occasions, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the significance of this relational interest between a father and a
child.7' One of the strongest appraisals and affirmations of these paternal rights
came in Justice White's dissent in Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth. In arguing
for the protection of paternal rights in the abortion arena, Justice White explained:
[T]he husband has an interest of his own in the life of the fetus
which should not be extinguished by the unilateral decision of the
wife. It by no means follows, from the fact that the mother's
interest in deciding "whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"
outweighs the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus,
that the husband's interest is also outweighed and may not be

67 See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
68 See Black, supra note 65, at 1007.

69 Id. at 1009 (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J. 624,
640 (1980)).
70

See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).

See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding that sex-based discrimination
between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers, which permits an unwed mother but not an
unwed father to block the adoption of their child simply by withholding consent violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding
a state statute under which children of unwed fathers become wards of the state upon the death of
their mothers violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
71

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss2/9

10

Lude: After Farley v. Sartin: The Consequences of Declaring a Nonviable

1996]

AFTER FARLEY v. SARTIN

protected by the State. A father's interest in having a
child-perhaps his only child-may be unmatched by any other
interest in his life.72
Thus, Justice White recognized that a father not only has the right to procreate,
but he also has the right to intimately associate with his children.73
The judicial recognition a father's fundamental right of procreation,
intimate association, and right of redress for injury to his child, including a
nonviable fetus in wrongful death, clearly gives a father a protected interest not
only in the life of his existing children, but also in the potential life of his
gestating child. These paternal rights may serve as the basis for a father's suit
for tortious abortion or tortious interference with a pregnancy. Such a recognition
would involve the weighing of a woman's right to abort, her right to bodily
autonomy, and her right to reproductive freedom, against a man's right to
procreate, his right to reproductive freedom, and his right to recover for wrongful
death.74 It is not inconceivable, especially in a state which recognizes a nonviable
fetus as a "person," 5 that these paternal rights could outweigh the maternal rights.
For example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has
inherently recognized the idea that life begins at conception, at least in the realm
of wrongful death.76 If the West Virginia legislature codified the court's view on
when life begins, 77 a father could argue that any injury to a nonviable fetus is an
injury to a life. In this context, abortion is a wrongful act.78 Thus, a father may
argue that an abortion not only injures, but also eliminates the valued life of a

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 93 (1976) (citation omitted) (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
72

73

Id.

74 Black, supra note 65, at 1027.
71 Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 534 (W. Va. 1995).
76

Id.

I The United States Supreme Court has upheld this type of legislative declaration, as long as it
"imposes no substantive restrictions on abortions." Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 505-06 (1989).
78 Black, supra note 65, at 1019.
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fetus79 and deprives him of his fundamental right of association and procreation,
including his right to enjoy the society of a child and to develop an intimate
parent-child relationship. Thus, a father could conceivably bring a tort suit for
tortious abortion or tortious interference with a pregnancy against the woman who
aborted his nonviable fetus because life, including that of a nonviable fetus, is
protected by the law under the wrongful death statute.80
Nevertheless, such a tort suit would still be subject to the undue burden
test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.8 However, because Casey disavowed that abortion is a fundamental
right,82 a mother's rights can no longer be presumed to take precedence over a
father's rights. 3 Moreover, if a court determines a father's rights to association
and procreation deserve strict scrutiny review, the balancing between paternal and
maternal rights will be a much closer call.84
Thus, a father could argue that allowing a suit for tortious abortion or
tortious interference with a pregnancy does not place a "substantial obstacle""5 on
a woman's right to have an abortion, for she may still obtain an abortion without
any direct state interference.86 Instead, such a tort reflects and promotes the West
Virginia court's policy (and hypothetically the legislature's policy) that life begins
at conception, and any injury to life, even potential, nonviable life, is protected
under the wrongful death statute.

79 Id.

80 Id.
81 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
82 See id. at

833.

83 Black, supra note 65, at 1031.
84 Id. at 1032.

8' Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
86

The United States Supreme Court has distinguished between direct state interference with

abortion and legislative policy promotion. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The Court
distinguished between "direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy," the former being unconstitutional and
the latter constitutional. Id. at 475.
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B.

Fetal Rights and Potential Tort Suits

As more courts begin to recognize and expand fetal rights, as the court
did in Farley, the possibility of tort suits against mothers by their own children
for injuries sustained prenatally become more probable. Historically, neither
common law nor statute required a woman to regard the health of her fetus above
that of her own health. 7 Nevertheless, with the departure from the parental
immunity doctrine in tort actions" and legal recognition of fetal rights, the door
for suits for prenatal injuries is wide open.
For example, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that a mother may
be liable for the negligent infliction of prenatal injuries.8 In Grodin v. Grodin,90
a pregnant woman took medication for her own health, resulting in damage to her
son's teeth. 9' In overruling the doctrine of family tort immunity, the court
concluded that the mother could be held liable for injurious neglect to her child
for improper prenatal medical care.92 In deciding that a pregnant woman could
be held liable under these circumstances, the court established a standard for
predicting liability: A mother must act as a "reasonable pregnant woman. 93
Other courts have also appeared to follow Grodin's holding that a pregnant
woman has a duty to protect the health of her fetus. 94

' Manson & Marolt, supra note 9, at 164; see also Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill.
1988) (noting that a legal duty to guarantee the mental and physical health of another has never
before been recognized by law).
" See, e.g., Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976) (rejecting the parental immunity
doctrine as a bar from a suit brought by a child against a parent).
9 Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).

90Id.
9' Id. at 869.
92

Id. at 870.

9'Id. at 871.
' See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980) (suggesting
that a woman may be held liable to her child for not preventing its birth if the mother anticipates
the probability of a birth defect); Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992) (holding that an infant
born brain damaged has a cause of action against his or her mother for the mother's negligence that
caused injury to the child when in utero). Courts have also been willing to force a pregnant
woman to submit to a Caesarean section in order to increase her chance of delivering a healthy
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However, Grodin and its progeny have been criticized for heralding a
snowball effect, in which a pregnant woman could be sued for all sorts of
activities, which have been deemed harmful to a fetus. 95 For example, a woman
may be liable for not only such known harms caused by alcohol consumption and
smoking during pregnancy, but she theoretically could be liable for excessive
exercise or not eating properly. Even more extreme, passing on unhealthy genes
could be viewed as tortious behavior." In fact, it is foreseeable that any act or
omission by a pregnant woman that could impact fetal development could be
subject to litigation.97
At least one court has sharply criticized the idea of a woman being held
liable for negligent infliction of prenatal injuries. 9 The Illinois Supreme Court
in Stallman v. Youngquist 9 rejected a cause of action by or on behalf of the fetus
against its mother for the negligent infliction of prenatal injuries.'
The court
reasoned that allowing such a cause of action would cause a mother and child to
be "legal adversaries from the moment of conception until birth."'' The court
also pointed out the difficulty in ascertaining a judicially defined standard of
conduct pregnant women would have to meet to satisfy state scrutiny." 2 Lastly,
baby. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987).

" Tiffany M. Romney, Comment, ProsecutingMothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: The State's
Interest in Protecting the Rights of a Fetus Versus the Mother's ConstitutionalRights to Due
Process, Privacy and Equal Protection, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 325, 331 (1991).
96 Gallagher, supra note 10, at 44.

9 Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (II1. 1988).
9I

Id. at 355.

99 Id.

'00Id. at 361.
'1'Id.at 359.
102Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360. The court explained:

If a legally cognizable duty on the part of mothers were recognized,
then a judicially defined standard of conduct would have to be met. It must be
asked, By what judicially defined standard would a mother have her every act
or omission while pregnant subjected to state scrutiny? By what objective
standard could a jury be guided in determining whether a pregnant woman did
all that was necessary in order not to breach a legal duty to not interfere with
her fetus' separate and independent right to be born whole? In what way would
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the court pointed out that holding a woman liable for the negligent infliction of
prenatal injuries subjects all of her decisions during pregnancy to state scrutiny
and infringes on both her right to privacy and her right to bodily autonomy."0 3
Other commentators have also criticized the imposition of tort liability on a
woman for negligent prenatal injuries for frightening ambivalent women toward
abortion and deterring her from keeping the child once it is bom.'
So far, West Virginia has not specifically recognized a cause of action for
the negligent infliction of prenatal injuries. Nevertheless, with the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals's abolishment of the parental immunity doctrine' °5 and
subsequent recognition of a nonviable fetus as a person,'0 6 the possibility of such
tort actions becomes more real. According to Kathryn Kolbert, Vice President
of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, '[o]nce you characterize the
fetus as a person you run the risk of... holding the woman herself liable."" 7
Although holding a mother civilly liable has not received widespread acceptance
in state courts, holding a mother criminally liable for injuries to her fetus appears
to be the new wave in protecting fetal rights. '
IV. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Although courts have historically given deference to the right of parental
autonomy,' 9 the doctrine of parens patriae allows the state to set minimum

prejudicial and stereotypical beliefs about the reproductive abilities of women
be kept from interfering with a jury's determination of whether a particular
woman was negligent at any point during her pregnancy?
Id. But see Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (establishing that an
expectant mother must act as a "reasonable" pregnant woman).
203

Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360.

104

Gallagher, supra note 10, at 45.

105

See Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976).

106

See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
Frances A. McMorris, CourtsAre Giving New Rights to Fetuses, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 1996,

at BI (quoting Kathryn Kolbert, vice president of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy).
10'See supra Part IV.
109 See supra notes 13-16.
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standards of conduct for the health and safety of the community."0 With the
increasing recognition of fetal rights, states are becoming increasingly compelled
to protect those rights by criminalizing certain behaviors of pregnant women. For
instance, over two hundred women in more than thirty states have been
prosecuted for conduct during pregnancy that has endangered the lives of their
fetuses."' These prosecutions appear to be a direct reaction by the states to the
alarming number of infants born each year with signs of drug-related illnesses.
In fact, approximately two hundred fifty thousand infants are born annually with
drug-related afflictions."1 2
In response to the drug problem, states across the country have attempted
to prosecute women who use drugs or alcohol during pregnancy on various
theories, including child endangerment," 3 child abuse and neglect," 4 and even

11'

Judith Kahn, Of Woman's FirstDisobedience: Forsaking a Duty of Care to Her Fetus-Is This

a Mother's Crime?, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 814 (1987).
"'

Bruce Fein, Lady Macbeth's Wanton Inheritors, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1996, at A 17.

112

id.

See Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that child
endangerment statute does not refer to an unborn child or encompass a woman's alleged drug use
during pregnancy); People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Geneva City Ct. 1992) (dismissing
child endangerment charges against pregnant woman who allegedly smoked cocaine because courts
may not extend the statute to include fetuses within the definition of "child," and because public
policy and due process considerations militate against such prosecutions); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d
710 (Ohio 1992) (finding that a mother cannot be convicted of child endangerment based solely on
prenatal substance abuse because the statute does not extend to fetuses or prenatal conduct);
Commonwealth v. Kemp, 643 A.2d 705 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (affirming dismissal of charges of
recklessly endangering the welfare of a child against a pregnant woman who allegedly ingested
cocaine and finding that neither the "child" nor "person" included an unborn "fetus").
"'

.. See In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1992) (holding that legislative history does not
support application of civil child abuse statute where child was born with positive drug toxicology
when pregnant woman had injected cocaine several hours prior to giving birth); State v. Carter, 602
So. 2d 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming the trial court's decision to dismiss charges of child
abuse against pregnant woman who allegedly used illegal drugs); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864
S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993) (affirming reversal of child abuse conviction, finding that to construe the
child abuse statute to apply to a woman's prenatal conduct would make the statute impermissibly
vague and violate legislative intent); State v. Osmus, 276 P.2d 469 (Wyo. 1954) (holding that
criminal neglect statute cannot be applied to a woman's prenatal conduct).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss2/9

16

Lude: After Farley v. Sartin: The Consequences of Declaring a Nonviable
AFTER FARLEY v. SARTIN

1996]

delivering drugs to a minor." 5 The majority of state courts have declined to
prosecute pregnant1 6women on these theories, often holding that the statutes do not
apply to fetuses.'
However, at least two states have recently been successful in their
prosecutions of drug-addicted pregnant women. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina in Whitner v. State"I ' upheld a woman's guilty plea to criminal child
neglect for causing her baby to be born with cocaine metabolites in its system
because of her crack cocaine use during her third trimester of her pregnancy."8
In doing so, the court in Whitner found that "it would be absurd to recognize the
viable fetus as a person for purposes of homicide laws and wrongful
death
' 19
statutes but not for purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse."'
A Wisconsin court has gone further, becoming the first state to charge a
woman with attempted murder for allegedly trying to kill her fetus with
alcohol. 2 ' A Wisconsin judge recently found that evidence that Deborah
Zimmerman gave birth to a baby girl, said to be limp, without color, and having
a blood-alcohol content of 0.199, supported charges of attempted first-degree
intentional homicide and first-degree reckless conduct against Zimmerman.'
Although Zimmerman's defense attorney has maintained that the charges do not

"5 See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (reversing pregnant woman's convictions for
"delivering drugs to a minor" and declining the state's invitation to walk down a path that the law,
public policy, reason, and common sense reject); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that statute proscribing delivery and distribution of cocaine did not encompass prenatal
transmission); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that statute
prohibiting delivery of cocaine to children was not intended to apply to pregnant drug abusers).
116

See supra notes 113-115.

"7

No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996).

228 Id.at
29

*4.

Id. at *3. The court also declared that there was "no question here that Whitner endangered the

life, health, and comfort of her child," because she ingested crack cocaine during her third trimester
of pregnancy. 1d. at *4.
20

'Deadly'Alcohol ChargesAllowed, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 1996, at 3.

2

d. Zimmerman's own blood-alcohol level was 0.30%. Judge Dennis Barry concluded that

"'[t]he instrumentality ... was not the shooting of a bullet or the plunging of a knife. Instead, it
was the massive consumption of a potentially deadly quantity of alcohol."' Id. (alteration in the
original).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 99, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:339

apply because a fetus is not legally recognized as a human being, 2 2 it remains to
be seen whether this argument will ultimately prevent Zimmerman from being
convicted of the attempted murder her unborn child.
Cases like Whitner and Zimmerman invoke strong arguments both for and
against the prosecution of women for using drugs and alcohol during pregnancy.
Those who argue that women should be prosecuted for behavior during pregnancy
that endangers their fetuses maintain that states have a compelling interest in
protecting the potential life of a fetus. 2 3 Furthermore, a state also has an interest
in protecting a newbom's right to be born healthy and free from drug-induced
abnormalities. 124 In addition, the state has an interest in protecting the health of
the mother'25 and state intervention helps steer a drug-abusing woman toward
needed drug treatment. 26 Finally, prosecution of these crimes specifically and
generally deters a woman from using drugs during their pregnancy. 127
John Robertson, a leading fetal rights advocate, has proposed his own
theory of protecting fetal rights. 128 Robertson contends that a fetus should be
protected under a theory of "contingent legal personhood.' 29 Such a theory
would subject women to criminal and civil liability for all damaging acts and
omissions before the birth of a child. 3
Furthermore, declaring a fetus a
"contingent legal person" would license governmental imposition or restraints on
a woman's medical decisions and lifestyle choices during pregnancy, even before
her fetus was viable, if there were clear and convincing evidence of a woman's
intent to carry a child to term.' These arguments for prosecution clearly support
122

Id.

323

Wright, supra note 43, at 1301.

124 Id.

125Id.
126

at 1302.

Romney, supra note 95, at 328.

127 Id.

32'

129

Gallagher, supra note 10, at 11.
Id. (quoting John Robertson, The Right to Procreateand In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL

MED. 333, 352 (1982)).
130

id.

131

Id.
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the idea that protecting the health of the potential life, the health of the mother,
and general social welfare outweigh a pregnant woman's right to engage in
dangerous behavior during pregnancy.' 32
On the other hand, many compelling arguments can be made against
prosecuting women for behavior they engage in during pregnancy. Those against
prosecution argue that criminalizing maternal behavior is one of the most
intrusive means of protecting potential life and the means least likely to achieve
its purported goals.' For example, prosecuting mothers for conduct they engage
in during their pregnancy flies in the face of a woman's constitutionally protected
right to privacy, bodily autonomy, and self-determination regarding decisions
relating to her child and her own body. 134 Furthermore, the state's interest in
preventing prenatal harm of the fetus is not compelling enough to overcome a
woman's privacy rights because the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend
35
protection to unborn children under Roe v. Wade.
Not only does criminal prosecution of pregnant woman violate her right
to privacy, but also the expectant mother's fear of criminal sanctions could deter
her from seeking prenatal care or substance abuse treatment. 136 Additionally,
physicians and other health care providers could be required to report a woman
137
to a state authority for acts that may endanger her fetus during pregnancy.
Fear of being reported to the police by health care providers will discourage her
from communicating honestly about her health and drug addiction to her health
care provider. 13' This could destroy a woman's trust in her physician and cause

132

Wright, supra note 43, at 1306.

133

Manson & Marolt, supra note 9, at 176.

'34 Wright, supra note 43, at 1293. Lynn Paltrow, staff attorney for the ACLU's Reproductive
Freedom Project, also argues that any legal duty imposed on a pregnant woman who uses a harmful
substance during her pregnancy is a violation of her constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 1289.

"' Id. at 1302.
136

137

Manson & Marolt, supra note 9, at 172-73.
Id. at 171. Although physicians and health care providers must report cases of suspected child

abuse and neglect under most child abuse and neglect statutes, usually such statutes do not regard
the fetus as a child and afford no protection to the unborn. See Mary Beth Murphy, Protecting
Fetus at What Cost?: Medical, Legal Issues Raised by Detention, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept.
18, 1995, at 1. However, if a state declared a fetus a child under its child abuse and neglect statute,
then health care providers would be required to report on incidents of prenatal child abuse as well.
13' Respondent's Brief at 37, Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
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her to conceal vital facts about both her health and the health of her fetus 3 9 and
turn a doctor's office into an "interrogation room."' 40
However, prosecutions of pregnant women may not stop at just drug or
alcohol abuse. When society chooses to punish pregnant women for their drug
use, it opens the door for additional restrictions on the women's behavior.
According to Lynn Paltrow of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, "'[i]f
you could detain women to protect the fetus then virtually every pregnant woman
could be detained because so much of daily living poses a risk to the developing
fetus.""'4 Women could be subject to prosecution for any behavior they engage
in during pregnancy that may harm their fetuses, including failing to eat properly,
using tobacco, taking prescription drugs, or exposing their fetuses to hazards in
the workplace.'4 2
Furthermore, legal enforcement of fetal rights would require a system of
state surveillance oppressive to all women of child bearing age.'43 Ensuring that
women do not engage in any harmful behavior during pregnancy would create a
virtual pregnancy police in direct violation of a woman's constitutional right to
privacy. Theoretically, women who suffer miscarriages, stillbirths, or other
complications during pregnancy could be subject to prosecution and required to
defend their behavior during pregnancy."'
West Virginia has, thus far, not criminalized the behavior of a woman
during pregnancy that may adversely affect her fetus. However, after Farley, a
nonviable fetus is defined as a person for the purpose of wrongful death. This
expansion of fetal rights by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia could
serve as a springboard for affording the nonviable and viable fetus protection
under the West Virginia child abuse and neglect statutes.45 and possibly even

'3

Manson & Marolt, supra note 9, at 172.

140

Wright, supra note 43, at 1318.

'~'

Murphy, supra note 137, at 1.

342

See Romney, supra note 95, at 343.

113 See Janet Gallagher, Fetus as Patient, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE
1990's, at 185, 200
(Sherill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989).
'4

41

See-Romney, supra note 95, at 344.
W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8D-3 to -4 (1992 & Supp. 1996).
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under the homicide statutes. 4 6 As Justice Toal reasoned in Whitner v. State, "it
would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of...
wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of statutes proscribing child
abuse."' 47 Thus, a strong argument can be made that under West Virginia law a
nonviable fetus should also be recognized as a person under criminal statutes.
V. INFRINGEMENT ON A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO HAVE AN ABORTION

Currently, a woman still has the constitutional right to have an abortion,
at least up until the point of viability."' However, there is an "inherent conflict"
in granting a cause of action on behalf of a nonviable fetus while giving a woman
a constitutional right to abort that same nonviable fetus.'4 9 As Kathryn Kolbert,
Vice-President of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy notes,
is a back-door way
.. [r]ecognition of the [nonviable] fetus as an individual person
150
to undermine the rights guaranteed by Roe v. Wade.""5
At least some state courts agree with Ms. Kolbert's analysis and have
refused to extend nonviable fetuses person status under their wrongful death
statutes. For example, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Toth v. Goree"5 '
recognized the inconsistency in abortion rights and nonviable fetal rights and
refused to afford a nonviable fetus protection under the Michigan wrongful death
statute. 52 Justice Danhof, speaking for the majority, reasoned:
If the mother can intentionally terminate the pregnancy at three
months, without regard to the rights of the fetus, it becomes
increasingly difficult to justify holding a third person liable to the
fetus for unknowingly and unintentionally, but negligently,

W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1992 & Supp. 1996). Under current West Virginia law, a person cannot
be prosecuted under the murder statute for the killing of a viable fetus. See State ex rel. Atkinson
v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1984).
'4

14' No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *3 (S.C. July 15,
14"

1996).

See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

14 See Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264, 1268 (Md. 1995).

150 McMorris, supra note 107, at B1 (alteration in original).
"'1 237 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
'52 Id. at 303-04.
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causing the pregnancy to end at that same stage. There would be
an inherent conflict in giving the mother the right to terminate
on
the pregnancy yet holding that an action may be brought
53
behalf of the same fetus under the wrongful death act.'
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Wallace v. Wallace'54 also agreed with the
court's reasoning in Toth, and held that a wrongful death action could not be
maintained on behalf of a nonviable fetus.'55 The court, in passing, remarked that
"it would be incongruous for a mother to have a federal constitutional right to
deliberately destroy a nonviable fetus and at the same time for a third person to
be subject to liability to the fetus for his unintended but merely negligent acts."' 5 6
West Virginia has now done what the courts in Toth and Wallace refused
to do. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has declared that a
nonviable fetus is a person under the wrongful death statute.'57 In essence, the
court in Farley has said that a nonviable fetus may be recognized as a person and
be afforded a legal cause of action under West Virginia law, but that same
nonviable fetus may be legally and constitutionally terminated at any time by the
woman who carries it.'5 8 Such a result is incongruous and undermines the
viability concept in both Roe and Casey.
Furthermore, with the increased willingness of the United States Supreme
Court to protect fetal rights,'59 there may be more room for a state, such as West
Virginia, that recognizes nonviable fetal right to argue that the state has a
compelling interest in protecting the fetus at any stage of a woman's pregnancy.60
Such a decision would virtually give full constitutional protections to the unborn,

...Id. at 303-04.
114

421 A.2d 134 (N.H. 1980).

...Id. at 136.
i56

Id. at 137 (citation omitted).

15'

Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 534 (W. Va. 1995).

"" Id. at 534-35.
159

See supra part II.C.

161

See Wright, supra note 43, at 1303.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss2/9

22

Lude: After Farley v. Sartin: The Consequences of Declaring a Nonviable

1996]

AFTER FARLEY v. SARTIN

both viable and nonviable.1 61 In such a scenario, it would be very difficult, if not
impossible, to justify granting a woman a right to terminate a life given full rights
under the Constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION

The concept of viability is crucial to the delicate structure of Roe v. Wade
and, consequently, in affording a woman a constitutional right to have an
abortion. The line of viability has been consistently pushed back and undermined
by the Supreme Court since Roe, and any further recognition of fetal rights could
erode Roe even further.
West Virginia's granting of "person" status to a nonviable fetus for the
purpose of wrongful death gives rise to many consequences and ramifications that
may serve to upset and undermine the Roe balance. There simply are no bright
lines or stopping points once nonviable fetuses are granted rights under the law.
The granting of these rights pave the way for limitless tort liability, including
suits by fathers and by children themselves, against the pregnant woman.
Furthermore, a woman could be subject to criminal prosecution for her behavior
during pregnancy, which would entail intrusive and substantial state interference
with her right to privacy. Ultimately, the recognition of nonviable fetal rights
could lead to a state justifiably infringing on a woman's constitutionally protected
right to have an abortion. Even if a state could not legally ban abortion, the
abundance of civil suits and criminal liability which will likely arise from the
conferring of these rights would chill a woman's freedom of choice and place an
undue burden upon her decision to have an abortion. Therefore, granting
nonviable fetuses rights of "personhood" is an overwhelming if not dangerous
proposition: Once the floodgates are open, true reproductive freedom for women
may become a thing of the past.
Stacie L. Lude

161

id.
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